This paper analyses one of the main pillars of Brazil's newly found economic resilience: a maturing FX market providing support to its managed ‡oating exchange rate regime. I 
Introduction
Generations have come to know Brazil as the country of the future. However, its perpetual struggle with economic disorders -monetary instability, …scal imbalances, and Balance of Payments crisis, to name a few -rendered the impression that such a future would never arrive.
Some felt Brazil was bound to be the country of the future forever. Now that skepticism looks misplaced, as Brazil's fast recovery from the global …nancial crisis of 2008 and solid growth rates in its aftermath have changed the mind of many pessimists. The view that Brazil is …nally unleashing its full potential is becoming widespread. According to forecasts from the International Monetary Fund, published in the September 2011 edition of the World Economic Outlook, Brazil is likely to become the world's …fth-largest economy in 2016, overtaking Italy, the United Kingdom, and France.
One of the main pillars of Brazil's newly found economic resilience relies on its managed ‡oating exchange rate regime. Particularly, this study will support the view that the Brazilian economy's future ability to absorb and recover from upcoming liquidity shocks hinges upon the well-fuctioning of its maturing FX market, which provides essential support to the managed ‡oating system. When Brazil formally adopted an o¢ cial in ‡ation target as its monetary policy strategy in July 1999, the unpleasant task of absorbing external shocks was assumed by the exchange rate. The global …nancial crisis of 2008 is a good example of a severe liquidity shortage imposed on the Brazilian FX market. As global fundamentals worsened, end-user customers'pressure to buy foreign currency rapidly amounted. On one hand, rising risk aversion coupled with foreign investors' need to o¤set losses in their head o¢ ces led to massive out‡ows from …nancial customers. On the other hand, as demand for Brazilian commodity-based exports dwindled, foreign exchange liquidity usually provided by commercial ‡ows slumped.
Consequently, the Brazilian real depreciated by more than 60% between August 1 and December 5, 2008 . After the initial depreciation, the exchange rate remained highly volatile for a couple of additional months but, as …gure 1 reveals, by the end of the …rst quarter of 2009 it was already converging back towards pre-crisis levels.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
In this paper, I analyze some speci…c characteristics of the Brazilian FX market, with special attention to the interaction between customers, dealers, and the central bank. First, it is important to note that in terms of trading volume the Brazilian FX market is smaller than the FX markets of the main currency pairs. Therefore, it is unreasonable to expect customers' imbalances to be resolved within a trading day. This implies that part of endusers' excess demand for foreign currency in a trading day has to be supplied by domestic dealers. In other words, domestic dealers from the Brazilian FX market do not simply behave as intermediaries, matching buyers and sellers while the market is open, and ending the trading day with zero balances. Dealers do hold overnight foreign exchange positions and, naturally, require an additional premium to bear the overnight risk (which takes the form of a price change). Second, although domestic dealers provide short-term liquidity to the Brazilian FX market, they are not a long-term solution. Changes in the price of foreign currency will keep amounting, re ‡ecting changes in dealers' overnight positions, until the non-dealer sector is …nally induced to provide the required liquidity. For instance, "stabilizing speculators"would decrease their demand for foreign currency if they believed that its price was too expensive.
Third, the rebalancing of the FX market after a liquidity shock rarely occurs in an orderly fashion. Consequently, the Central Bank of Brazil (BCB) frequently steps in, intervening in the Brazilian FX market in such a way that, ideally, only the exchange rate shot-run volatility is a¤ected, but not its long-run trend.
Motivated by the observations above, this paper develops a microstrucure model more suitable to describe the Brazilian FX market. The model introduces two major changes relative to previous microstructure models: a. Dealers' foreign holdings at the end of each trading day are not exogenously set (to zero, for example): they may decide to hold overnight positions in the FX market if they …nd it pro…table to do so; b. Customer ‡ow is not simply the realization of a random variable: the model moves towards a general equilibrium approach in which customers'demand for foreign exchange is in ‡uenced by macroeconomic fundamentals, including contemporaneous e¤ects from exchange rate movements (which, for example, capture feedback trading arising from "stabilizing speculators" or central bank interventions).
After solving the model, I …nd empirical evidence supporting its main predictions using a unique data set, covering all transactions between dealers and customers from the o¢ cial Brazilian FX market from July 1, 1999 to June 30, 2003. Interestingly, the global …nancial crisis of 2008 was not the …rst major test the ‡oating exchange rate regime had to endure. As a matter of fact, the resilience displayed by the Brazilian FX market in this recent crisis may be attributed, in great part, to learning experiences acquired from previous sudden stops in capital ‡ows that the ‡oating exchange rate regime had to face during its early years. Figure 2 presents the evolution of the exchange rate during the sample period studied by this paper. In 2001, the US dot-com bubble burst, the September 11 attacks, the …nancial contagion from the Employing a Structural VAR approach, which explores information regarding the type of customer who is trading against the dealer, I …nd empirical evidence that dealers from the Brazilian FX market do charge a premium to provide overnight liquidity. Speci…cally, in order to meet a US$ 100 million customer order ‡ow, dealers increase the price of foreign currency by approximately 0.35%. Moreover, I also …nd evidence of customer feedback trading: a 1% depreciation of the Brazilian real decreases …nancial ‡ows by US$ 68 million and commercial ‡ows by US$ 47 million. Finally, estimation output suggests that the BCB tends to sell foreign currency to dealers when the exchange rate is depreciating (leaning-against-the-wind) or when there is a positive excess demand for foreign exchange from …nancial customers (liquidity provision): a 1% depreciation of the Brazilian real is associated with a US$ 23 million sale from the central bank to dealers; and a US$ 100 million …nancial customer ‡ow is associated with a US$ 23 million sale from the central bank to dealers.
The behavior of nominal exchange rates has been a major challenge to explain since Meese and Rogo¤ (1983) documented that a naïve random walk would outperform a variety of macro models in terms of out-of-sample forecast. 1 In a seminal paper, Evans and Lyons (2002) moved away from models that relied solely on macroeconomic fundamentals and introduced order ‡ow as a key determinant of exchange rates dynamics. Empirical evidence supporting microstructure models, both in-sample (see Evans and Lyons, 2002 ) and out-of-sample (see The model also presents two important improvements relative to previous microstructure models. First, customer ‡ow, X t , is not simply the realization of a random variable. Instead, this type of ‡ow is a function of the exchange rate and other macroeconomic fundamentals.
Let s t be the (log of the) amount of domestic currency necessary to purchase one unit of foreign currency in period t and let F t be a vector of macroeconomic fundamentals which also a¤ect customer ‡ow, such as domestic and foreign interest rates or the country sovereign risk premium. Customer ‡ow is, then, described by the following expression:
in which 1 < 0 denotes that customers' demand for foreign currency decreases as its price increases.
The second important improvement is that dealers'foreign exchange holdings at the end of each trading day are not exogenously set (to zero, for example): dealers may optimally decide to hold overnight positions in the FX market, with the desired amount being determined by pro…t maximization. This implies that dealers play a dual role in the model: …rst as intermediaries, matching buyers and sellers within a trading day; and second as speculators, whose pro…ts arise from the overnight payo¤ on their foreign exchange holdings (the sum of interest rate di¤erential and overnight depreciation rate).
There is an overlapping generation of a continuum of identical dealers in the FX market.
Each dealer within its generation is indexed by i 2 [0; 1] and "lives" for two periods. Young dealers are responsible for supplying the excess demand of customers in a given period t. Let Q t be the market-wide level of FX inventory held by dealers in period t. Since a positive customer ‡ow means that there is a positive excess demand for FX, we can write:
In each period t, trading occurs in two rounds. In the …rst round, each young dealer i trades with old dealers and with its customers at the …rst round equilibrium price s t;1 . In the second and …nal trading round, each dealer i readjusts its foreign exchange inventory by trading with other dealers. In the …rst round of the following trading day, t + 1, young dealer of generation t sells its positions, collects its pro…ts, and exits the FX market. Let Q i t;1 and Q i t;2 be the foreign exchange holdings of dealer i after the …rst and the second trading rounds respectively. The dealer's pro…t function can be written as:
The …rst part of the pro…t function of dealer i from generation t is given by its …rst round holdings (the amount purchased from old dealers and from its customers) multiplied by the change in the equilibrium exchange rate between the …rst and the second trading rounds, s t;2 s t;1 . The second part is the payo¤ that it receives from its overnight foreign exchange holdings. This payo¤ is composed by the change in the exchange rate equilibrium price between the second round of period t and the …rst round of period t + 1, s t+1;1 s t;2 , plus the constant overnight dividend V paid by the FX from period t to t + 1. To simplify the calculations, we will assume from now on that V = 0. All dealers maximize identical negative exponential utility de…ned over its pro…ts, with constant absolute coe¢ cient of risk aversion .
The market clearing condition imposes that the total amount of foreign exchange held by young dealers at the end of the …rst round equals the total amount of foreign exchange sold by old dealers exiting the market, subtracted by the total demand from customers:
Since dealers only trade with other dealers in the second and …nal round, the total amount of foreign exchange held overnight by dealers has to equal the total amount of foreign exchange at the end of the …rst round:
Finally, the information structure is as follows. The realization of macroeconomic fundamentals F t N F ; 2 F is known before the market opens. Customers perfectly observe F t and decide how much foreign currency they need to exchange in the …rst round. After the …rst and before the second trading rounds, each dealer receives new information, in the form of a common signal. The signal, F c t = F t+1 + " i t , with " t N 0; 2 " , is correlated to the following period's macroeconomic fundamentals and will a¤ect the following period's customer ‡ow.
Solution
Let E t;j (:) and V ar t;j (:) be the expectation and the variance of a random variable conditional on all information available in round j of period t, respectively. Given that conditional on all information available at the …rst round, s t;2 is normally distributed, and conditional on all information available at the second round, s t+1;1 is also normally distributed, dealer i optimal foreign exchange holdings in each trading round will be given by:
Proposition 1 There are rational expectations equilibrium exchange rates for trading round 1 and trading round 2 within the class of functions of the form:
These prices are given by:
Proof. See appendix 2.
Corollary 1
The change in the exchange rate between the end of period t 1 and the end of period t can be written as:
with 1 < 0 and 2 > 0 if the following condition is veri…ed:
Proof. Equation (15) follows directly from equation (9) and equation (2) . Also, since 1 < 0 and 2 > 0, equation (14) implies that 2 > 0 if condition (16) is satis…ed. Finally, if 2 > 0, then from equation (13) it is necessarily the case that 1 < 0.
Keeping in mind that the exchange rate is de…ned as the amount of domestic currency necessary to purchase one unit of foreign currency, 1 < 0 and 2 > 0 implies that the exchange rate depreciates if there is pressure from customers to purchase foreign currency from dealers (X t > 0) or if the signal received by dealers indicates an increase in future customer demand ( F c t > 0 could be interpreted, for example, as a signal from rating agencies that sovereign bonds might be downgraded). One …nal comment should be made about the condition that limits the sensitivity of customer ‡ow to exchange rate changes. Imagine an exogenous shock that increases customer ‡ow by X. Given equation (15) , this excess demand will depreciate the exchange rate. If 1 is negative, the exchange rate depreciation will feedback into the customer ‡ow by reducing it. However, if the magnitude of the feedback e¤ect is too large, the decrease in customer ‡ow could be strong enough to generate a negative customer ‡ow larger than the initial shock X, which would lead to a subsequent appreciation of the exchange rate even larger in magnitude than the original depreciation. Equation (16) rules out this possibility.
Dataset 3.1 Description
The dataset used in this paper contains all customer ‡ows between domestic dealers and three types of counterparties in the o¢ cial Brazilian FX market: commercial customers (whose demand for foreign exchange is generated by a trade in goods with non-residents), …nancial customers (whose demand for foreign exchange is generated by a trade in assets with non- The dataset also includes the following pre-determined variables: the foreign interest rate, the domestic interest rate, and a measure of the Brazilian sovereign risk premium, all three in …rst di¤erence. The foreign interest rate is the daily annualized Fed Funds rate, the domestic interest rate is the daily annualized Selic rate, and the risk premium is measured as the spread of the C-Bond (the most liquid Brazilian Brady bond in the sample period) over the Treasury, measured in annualized rates, so a 1% risk premium is equivalent to a 100 basis-point spread of the yield of the C-bond over a Treasury bill of equivalent maturity. Table 1 presents summary statistics.
[Insert Table 1 about here] 3.2 Endogeneity and Overnight Liquidity Figure 2 displays the relationship between the exchange rate, de…ned as the Brazilian real price of one US dollar, and the cumulative customer order ‡ow in Brazil (cumulative customer order ‡ow in a date t is de…ned as the sum of all customer ‡ows between date 0 and date t).
Two features are noteworthy:
a. Correlation between the cumulative customer ‡ow and the exchange rate is negative (and signi…cant at the 1% level).
b. Market-wide customer ‡ow each day does not net to zero, implying that dealers from the Brazilian FX market do not simply behave as intermediaries, matching buyers and sellers during the day. If, for example, at the end of a given day there are more buyers than sellers, the dealers may supply the extra overnight liquidity.
The negative correlation between cumulative customer ‡ow and the exchange rate found in the sample is indicative of the presence of "feedback trading" in the Brazilian FX market:
as the domestic currency slowly depreciates, customers' demand for foreign currency slowly Two additional empirical exercises provide more formal evidence on the presence of endogeneity between customer ‡ows and the exchange rate. Table 2 reveals that bivariate Granger causality tests reject the null hypothesis that exchange rate movements do not Granger cause commercial nor …nancial ‡ows at the 1% signi…cance level. The null hypothesis that exchange rate movements do not Granger cause intervention ‡ows is also rejected, but at the 10% significance level. These results di¤er from Killeen et al (2006) , which …nd no evidence of Granger causality running from the french franc/deutsch mark exchange rate to the interdealer order ‡ow of the same market. 3 [Insert Table 2 about here] Table 3 provides estimation output of single equation OLS regressions using the …rst difference of the log of the exchange rate as the dependent variable and the total customer ‡ow from the retail market as a regressor. 4 The estimated coe¢ cient is either negative and signi…cant at the 1% signi…cance level if no controls are included, or not signi…cant at the 5% signi…cance level if the pre-determined variables are included as additional controls. What does this result mean? Does it mean that the demand for foreign currency in the retail FX market decreases as a result of an increase in its price, or that pressure to buy in the retail FX market does not increase the price of foreign currency? Most likely, the coe¢ cients from the OLS regressions have no economic interpretation since they are probably biased towards zero due to the presence of endogeneity.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
We have also noticed from …gure 1 that customer ‡ows from the retail market do not net to zero at the market-wide level at the daily frequency. In other words, dealers are providing liquidity overnight, by absorbing the change in the country's foreign exchange inventory generated by customers' underlying economic transactions (in goods and assets) with nonresidents. If dealers …nd it optimal to do so, then we should expect them to be making pro…ts from overnight liquidity provision. We calculate these "speculative"pro…ts using the methodology described in Hau (2001) , which gauges whether on average the price of foreign currency goes up (pro…ts) or down (losses) when dealers hold more foreign currency than usual. 5, 6 The result reveals that for each dollar that dealers supplied overnight, they made a daily pro…t of 0.035%, or a 9.3% annualized pro…t rate.
Empirical Evidence

Estimation Strategy
Hasbrouck (1991) suggests that trades and quote revisions can be modeled from an econometric perspective as a system characterized by auto-and cross-correlations of a very general nature.
Under his framework, the information impact of a trade is formally de…ned as the impact on prices resulting from the unexpected component of the trade. A vector autoregression (VAR)
is the primary statistical technique employed to identify trade innovations. My estimation strategy will follow a Hasbrouck-style analysis.
Let y t be the vector of endogenous variables, including the daily change in the (log of the) spot exchange rate, s t , the …nancial customer ‡ow, X F t , the commercial customer ‡ow, X C t , and the central bank intervention ‡ow, X I t :
Also, let Z t be the vector of pre-determined macroeconomic variables, including the …rst di¤erences of the domestic interest rate, r t , the foreign interest rate, r t , and the sovereign risk premium, # t :
5 These are not the only source of the dealers' pro…ts. One component of the dealers' pro…ts in the FX market comes from its role as an intermediation, by matching a buyer with a seller and pro…ting from the bid-ask spread. Another important source of pro…ts comes from the dividends "paid" by the foreign currency (the interest rate di¤erential). We are interested at the FX dealers "speculation" pro…ts, that is, the pro…ts that arise only from the change in the price of the asset he is trading. 6 Let Xt be the daily customer ‡ow. Now imagine that there is a representative dealer through the sample period, so that the daily market wide customer ‡ow equals the change on its daily holdings of FX. De…ne Qt = P T t=1 Xt as his inventory of FX. Let Q = 1 T P T t=1 Qt be the long run average inventory and e Qt = Qt Q be the daily deviation of the representative dealer from its long run average. Finally, let st be the exchange rate. The total pro…t of the representative dealer is given by = P T n=1 e Qt st+1.
I will estimate the following Structural VAR:
in which D q;t , q = 1; : : : ; Q, is a set of dummy variables which includes controls for each day of the week and each month of the year, and " t is a normally distributed vector of structural innovations, with zero mean and diagonal covariance matrix " .
Of special interest to the microstructure approach to exchange rates literature is the e¤ect of unexpected shocks on dealers'overnight foreign exchange positions, Q t , on exchange rate dynamics. Since our data captures the whole market, the daily change on dealers'FX holdings is given by Table 4 reports estimation output of the reduced form of a VAR(2) described by equation (19). 7 Based on the residuals of the VAR (2) [Insert Tables 4 and 5 about here]
Estimation Output
The following equations describe the endogenous relationships implied by the over-identi…ed system. All coe¢ cients are signi…cant at the 1% signi…cance level (see panel B in table 5 for standard errors):
There are several lessons which can be learned from the contemporaneous relationships presented above. First, dealers from the Brazilian FX market charge a 0.35% premium to provide US$ 100 million of overnight foreign exchange liquidity. Second, a 1% appreciation increases …nancial customers' demand for foreign exchange by US$ 68 million. Third, a 1% appreciation increases commercial customers'demand for foreign exchange by US$ 47 million.
Interestingly, these two coe¢ cients are negative, suggesting that "feedback trading" in the Brazilian FX market is stabilizing. Fourth, the central bank tends to sell foreign currency to dealers when the exchange rate is depreciating or when there is excess demand for liquidity from …nancial customers. While the former indicates a "leaning-against-the-wind" type of reaction, the latter is evidence of the BCB's "liquidity provision" role in the FX market.
Estimated coe¢ cients tell us that a 1% depreciation is associated with a US$ 23 million sell from the central bank to dealers and that a US$ 100 million …nancial customer ‡ow is associated with a US$ 23 million sell from the central bank to dealers. Finally, the p-value associated to the Wald test of overidentifying restrictions is 0.501, suggesting that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that all restrictions imposed on the matrix of contemporaneous relations A 0 are valid.
Conclusion
This paper develops and estimates a microstrucure model which more appropriately describes the Brazilian FX market. Detailed analysis of Brazil's maturing FX market helps understand the reason why Brazil's managed exchange rate ‡exibility remains a pillar of economic resilience. The model introduces two major changes relative to previous microstructure models.
First, dealers may decide to hold overnight positions in the FX market, if they …nd it pro…table to do so. Second, customers'demand for foreign exchange is a function of macroeconomic fundamentals, including contemporaneous feedback from exchange rate movements. The paper also presents empirical evidence supporting the main predictions of the model using a unique data set, covering all transactions between dealers and customers from the Brazilian o¢ cial be more di¢ cult for a dealer to rebalance its portfolio. Therefore, it is natural for the price impact of a trade to be larger in the smaller and less liquid market. Second, the exchange rate in an emerging economy is much more volatile than in a developed economy, and the riskier the asset, the larger the price change required for a risk averse agent to hold it.
A Proof of Proposition 1
To …nd the …rst and second trading rounds REE exchange rates, start with the following price conjectures:
Recall that optimal FX holdings of dealer i in each trading round are be given by: 
and the market clearing conditions impose:
Given the price conjectures we can write the expectation of the second round exchange rate conditional on information available only up to the …rst round as:
and the variance of the second round exchange rate conditional on the same information set as:
Assuming for simpli…cation that F = 0, plugging the conditional expectation and the conditional variance into each bank i optimal …rst round customer ‡ow demand given by equation (28) and imposing the market clearing condition given by equation (30), we arrive at:
By comparing the above equation to the price conjecture for s t;1 in equation (26), we can write 0 , 1 and 2 as functions of 0 , 1 , 2 and other structural parameters:
In the second round, banks can update their beliefs about the realizations of the future macroeconomic fundamentals F t+1 using the common signal F c t . Given F t+1 N 0; 2 F , we can apply the projection theorem to reach the following expressions:
Using the above expressions to calculate bank i period t second round expectations of period t + 1 …rst round equilibrium exchange rate we get:
Assuming for simpli…cation that V = 0, plugging the conditional expectation and variance into each bank i second round optimal foreign currency demand given by equation (29) and imposing the market clearing condition given by equation (31), we arrive at:
By comparing the above equation to the price conjecture for s t;2 in equation (27), we can write 0 , 1 and 2 as functions of 0 , 1 , 2 and other structural parameters:
Combine equations (43) The foreign interest rate is the daily annualized rate of the Fed Funds rate. The domestic interest rate is the daily annualized rate of the Brazilian Selic rate. The risk premium is the spread of the C-Bond (the most liquid Brazilian Brady bond in the sample period) over the Treasury, measured in annualized rates, so a 1% risk premium is equivalent to a 100 basis-points spread of the yield of the C-bond in % a.a. over the yield of a Treasury bill with the same maturity, also in % a.a. Jul-99 Jan-00 Jul-00 Jan-01 Jul-01 Jan-02 Jul-02 Jan-03
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